

Software Defined Radio for Infosec People 101

Garrett Gee

Agenda

- Radio Frequency
- Hardware
- Software
- Decoding (Passive) Examples – Planes, Ships, Pagers
- Hacking (Active) Examples – iOS, Cell Phones, House Alarm System
- Process for Decoding
- Reverse Engineering Example

@ggee - Hacker. Entrepreneur. Autodidact.

- Hacker

- 60 Minutes – Cyber War – 2000
- Portable Linux Auditing CD (PLAC) – 2001
- Doppelganger Domains – 2011
 - CNN, Wired, The Osgood File, Bloomberg BusinessWeek, BBC

- Entrepreneur

- Godai Group LLC
- Hacker Warehouse
- Infosec Events

- Autodidact

Background – Radio Frequency

- Any electromagnetic wave frequencies that lie in the range extending from around 3 kHz to 300 GHz
- Common Examples
 - AM / FM broadcast radio
 - Cell phones
 - Global Positioning System
 - Pagers
 - Television
 - Wi-Fi



UNITED STATES FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS

THE RADIO SPECTRUM

RADIO SERVICES COLOR LEGEND

AERONAUTICAL MOBILE	INTER-SATELLITE	RADIO ASTRONOMY
AERONAUTICAL MOBILE SATELLITE	LAND MOBILE	RADIO INFORMATION SATELLITE
AERONAUTICAL RADIONAVIGATION	LAND MOBILE SATELLITE	RADIOLOCATION
AMATEUR	MARITIME MOBILE	RADIOLOCATION SATELLITE
AMATEUR SATELLITE	MARITIME MOBILE SATELLITE	RADIONAVIGATION
BROADCASTING	MARITIME MOBILE MOBILE	RADIONAVIGATION SATELLITE
BROADCASTING SATELLITE	METEOROLOGICAL	SPACE OPERATION
EARTH EXPLORATION SATELLITE	METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE	SPACE RESEARCH
FIXED	MOBILE	STANDARD FREQUENCY AND TIME SIGNAL SATELLITE
FIXED SATELLITE	MOBILE SATELLITE	STANDARD FREQUENCY AND TIME SIGNAL SATELLITE

ACTIVITY CODE


FEDERAL EXCLUSIVE	FEDERAL/NO-FEDERAL SHARED
NON-FEDERAL EXCLUSIVE	

ALLOCATION USAGE DESIGNATION

SERVICE	EXAMPLE	DESCRIPTION
Primary	FIXED	Capital Letters
Secondary	MOBILE	1st Capital with lower case letters

The table is a public register in the context of the Table of Frequency Allocations and by the FCC and NIST. It is not an operating manual and does not contain any information on the use of frequency allocations. Therefore, for complete information, see the Table of Frequency Allocations and the Table of Frequency Allocations and the Table of Frequency Allocations.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
Office of Spectrum Management
JANUARY 2016



PLEASE NOTE: FEDERAL FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS IN THIS TABLE ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE. THE INFORMATION IN THIS TABLE IS FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY.

Background – Software Defined Radio

- Radio front end
- No dedicated IC backend for decoding radio signal
- Digitize signal and pass it to host system
- Mixers, filters, amplifiers, modulators/demodulators, etc. are all in software
- If you can tune it, you can be that type of radio (in theory)

SDR for Infosec?

- One device can talk to nearly infinite protocols
- Investigate protocols for which there are no public specs or chips
- Investigate protocols for which debugging equipment is \$\$\$, requires you to be a large company, requires NDA, etc.

Hardware

- Lots of SDR devices out there
- Frequency Range
- Bandwidth
- Receive Only / Half Duplex / Full Duplex
- Price

Hardware – RTL-SDR

- aka Digital Video Broadcasting – Terrestrial (DVB-T)
- Realtek RTL2832U/R820T Tuner Receiver
- Frequency Range: 24 MHz to 1.8 GHz
- Bandwidth: 2-3 MHz
- Receive only
- ~ \$10-\$20




Hardware – HackRF One

- Frequency Range: 1 MHz to 6 GHz
- Bandwidth: 20 MHz
- Transmit or receive. Half-duplex
- ~ \$330



Hardware – BladeRF x40

- Frequency Range: 300 MHz to 3.8 GHz
- Bandwidth: 28 MHz
- Transmit and receive. Full-duplex
- ~ \$440




Hardware – USRP


- Several product lines. Bus, Network, X
- Network and X lines have modular RF Daughterboard design
 - UBX board: 10 MHz to 6 GHz, 160 Mhz bandwidth, full-duplex
- ~ \$2000-\$5000




Software – Visualization - GQRX / SDR#



Software – GNU Radio




Software - Inspectrum



Software - Python

- GNU Radio
- Matplotlib
- numpy






Decoding Example - Planes

- ADS-B: Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast
- Aircraft gets position from satellite and broadcasts it for tracking
- No encryption or authentication
- Frequency: 1090 MHz / 978 MHz

Decoding Example – Planes – dump1090

Hex	Mode	Sqwk	Flight	Alt	Spd	Hdg	Lat	Long	Sig	Msgs	Ti-
400e14	S	7315	EZY43PT	37000	419	353			5	42	0
406099	S	7634	CFE59G	38000					5	17	2
484cb6	S	6264	KLM65G	36325	413	297	55.844	-0.518	5	88	0
406a2e	S	7615	GMA104T	28000					4	100	2
400fba	S	5431	BEE1VB	5350					35	733	0
4ca281	S	7322	UIR3007	33175	396	336	54.564	-2.611	12	946	0
400ad1	S	7607		20025					7	208	0
400721	S	4246	LOG47LU	8550					30	955	0
400c5c	S	1444		27025					5	95	32
40610e	S	7330	BEE3FU	24000					9	583	0
400cb9	S	7732	LOG79ES	14500					11	922	0
4012d2	S	5466	LOG34YT	7100					6	83	5
405633	S	6254	EZY44NH	19425	387	149	55.408	-4.174	6	3039	13
400617	S	3416	TCX61EF	21550	439	108	55.364	-3.253	16	5062	0
405f79	S	4477	BEE767	19125					38	6845	0
400984	S	4622	EZE28Z	21475					12	3243	0
4ca73d	S	4244	RYP6699	3250	156	279	56.017	-3.135	81	6853	0
400987	S	4621	EZE76LK	23475					11	6841	0
400691	S	7762	BAW9CG	32675	458	317	56.386	-4.997	11	16051	0
4066d1	S	2227	TOM296	33225	488	151	54.700	-3.405	8	8244	0
4008fb	S	7655	LOG74HR	17600					10	5627	0
491304	S	7646	CSDXD	40000					8	5268	0


Decoding Example – Planes – dump1090



Dump1090

9 planes on screen.

Click on a plane for info.



UTC



Last Update

[Reset Map]

AAL690 ⇒ AD0181 N937UW B752 [FlightAware] [FR24]

[FlightStats]

Country of registration: United States

Altitude: 37025 ft | 11278 m

Squawk: 2422

Speed: 486 kt | 900 km/h

RSSI: -13.3 dBFS

Track: 81° (East)

Last seen: now

Position: 33.276°, -117.617°

Distance from Site: 25.4 NM | 47.1 km


ICAO	Flight	Squawk	Altitude	Speed	Distance	Track	Mgs	Age
abeb7c	SWA3162	4632	2675 ▼	153	7.3	213	1868	0
a1c6a8		4731	2975 ▲	144	10.0	192	789	0
a8430d		1852	2800 ▼	200	10.5	254	2971	0
a31533		1855	7450 ▲	205	12.5	159	1833	0
abc8d3	AMX784	3264	6900	274	14.5	343	4161	0
a10353	N1643H	0221	4700	109	15.0	313	4294	1
a0ddfb	AAL2495	3657	9100 ▼	296	19.0	264	1706	0
aa1a16			13325 ▼	309	21.4	293	51	9
a9802f	N711EG	3753	4900	263	22.9	54	7929	0
a06a09	AAL58	2431	5525 ▼	197	23.2	339	11941	0

Decoding Example - Ships

- AIS: Automatic Identification System
- Similar protocol to ADS-B
- Frequency: 162 MHz

Decoding Example – Ships – gr-ais / opencpn

- gr-ais for receiving data
- Opencpn to map



Decoding Example - Pagers

- POCSAG: Post Office Code Standardization Advisory Group
- Frequencies: 35.22 / 35.58 / 43.22 / 43.58 / 152.0075 (medical) / 152.2700 / 152.4800 / 157.4500 (medical) / 158.1000 / 158.7000 / 163.2500 (medical) / 454.0125 - 454.5000 / 462.7500 – 462.9250 / 465.0000 / 929.0125 – 929.9875 / 931.0125 – 931.9875
- Gqrx | multimon-ng

Hacking (Active) Examples and Thoughts

ANDY GREENBERG SECURITY 06.04.15 7:00 AM

THIS HACKED KIDS' TOY OPENS GARAGE DOORS IN SECONDS



TRENDING IN IOS DEVICES

[Apple TV 4K, hands on with an AirPlay competitor for home wireless music](#)

TRENDING IN IOS DEVICES

[Opinion: How iPhone SE is tempting me to actually skip iPhone 7](#)

TRENDING IN AAPL COMPANY

[Apple Worldwide Developer Conference 2016: Everything you need to know about this year's WWDC](#)

FEBRUARY 15

AAPL: 93.99 0.29

Apple officially acknowledges iPhone bricking '1970 date' bug, says upcoming software update will fix

Benjamin Mayo - 2 months ago [@bzamayo](#)

[AAPL COMPANY](#) [IOS](#) [IOS DEVICES](#)





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by [Tom Spring](#)

February 18, 2016 , 4:54 pm

HOW STINGRAY WORKS

A Stingray is a mobile device that masquerades as a cellphone tower. It's usually mounted in a police surveillance vehicle.

Cellular tower

Stingray

WHO HAS IT?

The FBI and most other investigative bodies in the federal government, as do at least 25 different local and state police departments. Even more have access through sharing agreements with federal, state and regional task forces.

STINGRAY SYSTEM


Antennas on the police vehicle determine the distance and direction of the phone in relation to the Stingray and other cell towers, telling police where the phone is in real-time.

The intercepting device, known as Stingray, with related antenna and gear is sold under the names Amberjack, KingFish, Harpoon and RayFish.

Antenna

Laptop

Stingray



ANDY GREENBERG SECURITY 03.21.16 10:33 AM

RADIO ATTACK LETS HACKERS STEAL 24 DIFFERENT CAR MODELS



Other Interesting Systems

- Smart Meters
- Door Access Systems (ex. HID)
- Toll Tags (ex. FasTrak)
- Touch Payment Systems

Process for Decoding - 3 steps

- Determine Frequency
- Determine Modulation
- Determine Protocol / Structure

Restaurant Pagers from Long Range Systems



1 - Determine Frequency

- FCC database
 - <https://www.fcc.gov/general/fcc-id-search-page>
 - <https://fcc.io/>

1 results were found that match the search criteria:

Grantee Code: **M74** Product Code: **T7400**


Displaying records 1 through 1 of 1.

View Form	Display Exhibits	Display Grant	Display Correspondence	Applicant Name	Address	City	State	Country	Zip Code	FCC ID	Application Purpose	Final Action Date	Lower Frequency In MHz	Upper Frequency In MHz
	Detail Summary			Long Range Systems Inc	4550 Excel Parkway #200	AddsionTX		United States	75001	M74T7400	Original Equipment	03/24/2000	467.75	467.75

[Perform Search Again](#)

2 - Determine Modulation


- Gqrx / inspectrum




2 - Determine Modulation

- python

```
<matplotlib.image.AxesImage at 0x7ff896f484d0>
```




```
scope(digitized)
```





2 - Determine Modulation

- python

<matplotlib.image.AxesImage at 0x7ff896f484d0>



scope(digitized)




3 - Determine Protocol / Structure

- fc2d = preamble / header?
- 09 = function?
 - vibrate
 - lights
 - chime
 - all
- 0001 = pager id?
- 4478 = checksum?
- All those other bytes?

```
cs = decode_file('gqrx_20160314_pager1_467765000_80000_fc.raw')  
[distillrfbase.hexsearch(c, 'fc2d') for c in cs]
```

```
[BitStream('0xfc2d09000100000000004478'),  
BitStream('0xfc2d0900010000000000447, 0b100'),  
BitStream('0xfc2d09000100000000004478'),  
BitStream('0xfc2d0900010000000000447, 0b100'),  
BitStream('0xfc2d09000100000000004478'),  
BitStream('0xfc2d0900010000000000447, 0b100'),  
BitStream('0xfc2d09000100000000004478')]
```

```
scope_file('gqrx_20160314_pager1_467765000_80000_fc.raw')
```



Conclusion

- SDR allows for cheaper barrier to entry when looking at RF
- Basic attacks work against some proprietary systems
 - Don't rely on obfuscation
- Attack scenarios from traditional pentesting carries over to wireless
 - DoS
 - Fuzzing
 - Overflows
 - etc
- Dedicated hardware is still very useful for RE as the equipment was designed to work for that specific application
 - SDR might be the cheaper and/or only solution if black box testing

Questions?

Thanks and hack away!

- g@rrettgee.com
- <http://garrettgee.com/lethal/>
 - Slides
 - Links
 - Resources